Four members of Voices in the Wilderness UK joined up with three from Voices US to visit Iraq, from 8th to 18th May, on a sanctions-breaking delegation. These pages detail some of the visits they made, what they saw and the people they met.

Al Taji power station was built in 1976-8, and consists of 16 separate gas-turbine units which generate the electricity. Al Taji can operate on either natural gas, or a light oil fraction called “gas oil” [similar to petrol or diesel]. Engineers told us that it was originally used to top up baseline supply during periods of peak demand, though now is operating continuously. The gas turbine generators are military jet engines. This system is also used in Britain, and has the advantage that stations are quick and cheap to build, and electricity production begins within minutes of switching on. [Large thermal stations which use steam turbines as the generators, need several hours after start-up to start producing electricity.]

Like almost every power station in Iraq, Al Taji sustained severe damage during the Gulf War. Engineers report it took 5 years to do sufficient repairs to allow production to resume. Even so, some units are damaged beyond repair, and all others are operating in an unreliable state. During our visit, 5 of the 7 larger units were working, one was temporarily out-of-order, and one large and all nine smaller units were permanently not working
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In theory, if all units were producing at peak capacity, the station could produce well over 200MW. However, current production is around 80-90MW, and during our visit, as one unit was down, production was 60-70MW. (That’s the equivalent of a single electric kettle, and no other appliances, in 20,000 homes, or a single light bulb in one million homes.)

The engineers cited many problems in obtaining the parts necessary for essential maintenance and repairs. They described how, up until 1991, a full range of spare parts were held in stock, but they have long since been used up. Orders parts from abroad are subject to delays, from 6 months to indefinite. They showed us a copy of a ‘hold document’ from the UN sanctions committee, requesting minute details about the parts requested. [including: maximum pore size of filter, maximum and minimum air flow rates, material composition of nozzle.] Four new units had been ordered from a British company: two had arrived, of which one was incomplete; the other two were still on order. The engineers did not know the reason for the delays.

As a result of lack of parts, the station is working in an unreliable condition, and trips and breakdowns are commonplace. [If a unit stops working suddenly, that will put extra strain on the other units.] Efficiency is reported to be considerably below normal (about 22%, whereas it was about 28% in 1990). Engineers reported that efficiency is reduced because of problems with equipment, and a lower quality of fuel, as the oil refineries are also in poor repair. [Presumably this only applies to the liquid fuel.]

Engineers reported particular problems with turbine blades and control equipment; failure of these can result in severe damage to the rest of the equipment. Lack of maintenance causes unsafe operation, as safety standards cannot be adhered to. Engineers reported that there have been accidents resulting from poor quality of equipment.

Al Taji is one example of the problems plaguing the whole electricity network, which are cited by the UN, UNICEF, and other agencies. The whole power generating network is unable to meet demand, and even in Baghdad, blackouts, are common. The rest of the country suffers from less reliable electricity supply – in rural areas it can be only a few hours a day or less. The poor quality of supply is a further problem: an unstable and low frequency causes problems for motor appliances, such as pumps, fridges and fans. Unscheduled blackouts - because of faults, or demand which cannot be met - cause voltage surges which can damage sensitive appliances. These problems also add to the general wear suffered by the generating network itself. Essential components of the distribution network, essential for control and safe supply, are also in poor condition.

The UN report that the Iraqi power network is in such a precarious state, that sudden loss of a single power station could cause the whole electrical network to stop working. During our visit to the Electricity Ministry, we were told that sudden loss of a station the size of Al Taji would cause minor problems, and probably some localised blackouts. But loss of a medium-large sized power station, 300MW or larger, could result in the whole network going down. The Iraqi engineers described this as something they are all afraid of, and estimate that restarting the network would be no easy task, and would probably take several weeks, if they were to succeed at all. An independent power engineer based in the UK, when asked if this sounded credible, estimated that their story does not sound unrealistic. [For comparison, if the UK network was to go down, it would probably take a couple of days to restart it, and longer for the quality of supply to return to normal. The UK network has a full complement of parts, staff, and a modern and sophisticated control system – none of which are present in Iraq.]

Electricity is not a luxury for an urban population. Electricity is essential for pumping and treating of water and sewage, lighting, refrigeration, as well as domestic uses. Sectors of Iraq’s agriculture also depend on electricity, particularly for irrigation.

UNICEF states that the impact of power cuts on the water and sewage is considerable: reduced water pressure, increased likelihood of contamination of water, clogged sewers, back-flow of sewerage into living quarters, and disease. [1] The lack of an adequately functioning electricity network is depriving the civilian population of reliable drinking water, and contributing to water-borne infections. The UN Humanitarin Coordinator, Tun Myat, stated in May 2003 that "I consider water and sanitation to be the biggest killer of children in this country".[2]

1. UNICEF, 15 April 2002 Profile of Children and Women in Iraq and UNICEF Country Programme of Cooperation. 1. Situation of women and children

2. See What the agencies say

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