Contents

1. Chapter 1 - The Dimensions Of The Humanitarian Crisis
2. Chapter 2 - Overcoming The Legacy Of Sanctions
3. Chapter 3 - The Burden Of Responsibility
4. Chapter 4 - The Way Forward

1) THE DIMENSIONS OF THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS Return to top

An Evolving International Consensus

Over the past three years, the international community has evolved something approaching a consensus of opinion regarding the humanitarian situation in Iraq. According to the new consensus

1) There is a humanitarian crisis of massive proportions in Iraq.

2) The humanitarian crisis is very largely caused by the comprehensive economic sanctions being imposed on Iraq by the United Nations.

3) This is an intolerable situation that demands radical change in the measures being taken against Iraq.

Whitehall and the White House have been left rather isolated by the development of international and even domestic opinion.

This evolving consensus is demonstrated by the following set of quotations from very different parts of British public opinion.

On 8 April 2000, The Economist addressed the crisis in Iraq in an editorial entitled, 'All wrong in Iraq'. The world's leading business magazine observed: 'Slowly, inexorably, a generation is being crushed in Iraq. Thousands are dying, thousands more are leading stunted lives, and storing up bitter hatreds for the future.' The editorial offered the following assessment of the moral burden involved for the UN and for the Security Council in particular:

'If, year in, year out, the UN were systematically killing Iraqi children by air strikes, western governments would declare it intolerable, no matter how noble the intention. They should find their existing policy just as unacceptable. In democracies, the end does not justify the means.'

The following month, on 27 May 2000, the world's leading medical journal, The Lancet, suggested that sanctions should be 'suspended', apparently unconditionally, largely because of their humanitarian impact.

An earlier report from a group of Anglican Bishops, Conclusions from an Anglican visit to Iraq, May 3rd to 10th 1999, had stated firmly, 'we believe that the vast majority of the Iraqi civilian population is suffering grievous harm both physically and psychologically as a direct result of the sanctions policy imposed on the country by the UN Security Council.' The Bishops condemned the sanctions without reserve:

'Sanctions in their present form are ethically untenable, because they are hitting the weakest and most vulnerable. As Christians we find this utterly opposed to the mind of Christ.'

Writing in the right-wing Sunday Telegraph, the BBC's World Affairs Editor, John Simpson (who reported from Iraq in 1991), has been equally forthright. Referring to the continuing bombardment of Iraq, the BBC's senior foreign correspondent remarks that 'no one will listen when Saddam's officials say that civilians have been killed,' before moving on to the sanctions themselves:

'As for the people dying of malnutrition and disease, that is an attested fact. We dig deep into our pockets at the thought that Ethiopians might soon start dying again of hunger; but Iraqis? It's because we don't see them. Our governments pour contempt and scorn on those who call attention to these things...' ('Inhumane war that puts us all to shame', Sunday Telegraph, 30 April 2000, p. 32)

'If people could hear and see what is being done in their names in Iraq, they would be outraged. But they don't, so it continues.'

A sure sign that public opinion was indeed evolving in a particular direction came when a mainstream British political party, the Liberal Democrat, spoke out against the comprehensive economic sanctions at its party conference in September. Menzies Campbell, Foreign Affairs spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats, argued on 18 September 2000 that there would be no danger to regional security or world peace if the non-military sanctions were lifted.

'It should now become the policy of the British Government that sanctions other than those directly relevant to military or military related equipment should be lifted.'

A Complex Emergency

In last year's review of the humanitarian situation, UN agencies based in Iraq submitted a set of reports on various aspects of the humanitarian crisis. (Special Topics on Social Conditions in Iraq: An Overview Submitted by the UN System to the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues, 24 March 1999)

The World Health Organisation reported in a paper on 'Mental Health' in Iraq since 1990 that there has been a 'noticeable increase' in mental disorders such as 'stealing, hostility, tantrum, murder, vandalism; anxiety, depression, phobia, lack of self confidence, sleep disturbances, hypochondria; psycho-somatic disorders; post traumatic stress disorders; psychoses.' The numbers of mental health patients rose by over 130% between 1990 and 1998, according to the WHO.

'The number of young children and adolescents, below the age of 14 years and suffering from mental disorders increased by 124% between 1990 and 1998. The percentage of children below 10 years of age and with mental distress rose from 42% in 1996 to 56% in 1997.'

The UN Multi-Disciplinary Observation Unit reported that death rates among the elderly were 'unarguably' higher than in the pre-sanctions period. This was very largely due to the collapse in state-provided shelter for the elderly, and to the need in such vulnerable groups to sell government-provided food rations to raise cash for clothing, rented accommodation, and other needs.

The UN Development Programme estimated women's share of the urban job market in 1997 to be 1.3%, 'the lowest since 1985'. 'This was mainly due to economic and administrative downward adjustment of the public sector, the main source of employment for educated women.' The collapse of public sector employment being due to the collapse in public revenues because of economic sanctions.

The World Food Programme noted that while in the 1980s 'the destitute' registered with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) received a monthly cash allowance amounting to about US$ 175 (on average), in 1999, the cash allowance for the destitute amounted to about US$ 1.20. Furthermore, because of the ministry's inability to cope with the rapidly increasing number of 'the destitute', MOLSA officially ceased to register new cases in 1994. 'This was another signal of growing poverty and the inability of the GOI to continue to provide a social safety net.'

UNESCO observed that 'Iraq was awarded an international trophy' before the sanctions for the remarkable progress it made in eradicating illiteracy. The literacy rate shot up from an estimated 52 percent for the whole of Iraq in 1977 to 80 percent in 1987. 'In 1995, the rate of illiteracy was estimated at 42 percent; a major shift in favour of illiteracy.'

Across a wide range of social, cultural and psychological indicators, there are strong signs of a deep humanitarian crisis.

Killing The Children Of Iraq

Most international concern has focussed on the plight of the children of Iraq. In November 1997, a spokesperson for the UN children's agency UNICEF in Iraq, Philippe Heffinck, stated, 'It is clear that children are bearing the brunt of the... economic hardship.'

In August 1999, UNICEF estimated that 500,000 more children under the age of five died between 1990 and 1998 than would have died if child death rates had continued to decline at the rate they did in the 1980s. Hundreds of thousands of children died because basic health conditions in Iraq changed.

In the document 'UNICEF: Questions and Answers for the Iraq child mortality surveys', (16 August 1999) UNICEF set out the following question and answer:

'Does UNICEF think the type of sanctions imposed on Iraq are responsible for the rise in child mortality? It is certainly one factor. The Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues summarized the situation well when it said in March [1999] - "Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war".

The agency also asked and answered the following question: 'Given the results of this survey - does UNICEF think the sanctions should be lifted?'

'The imposition and lifting of sanctions is a matter for the Security Council. As an agency of the United Nations, UNICEF is bound by article 48 of the United Nations Charter to implement the decisions of the Security Council. 'UNICEF has voiced its concern repeatedly that if sanctions are to be implemented they should be implemented in such a way as to not have a negative impact on children. This is not the case in Iraq.' (Emphasis added.)

Dr. Peter Pellet, Professor of Nutrition at the University of Massachusetts, and the leader of several nutrition surveys in Iraq during the past decade, remarked in January 1999 that, 'Worldwide, poverty is the main determinant of malnutrition and child mortality. Hence it is not surprising that artificially induced poverty by economic embargo produces the same results.'

Dr. Pellet also observed, 'Sanctions are not the humane alternative to war that they are purported to be, and if there were justice in this world these actions promoted by the United States and Britain in the name of the UN would be seen as the crime against humanity that they are.' (letter, Guardian Weekly, 10 January 1999)

2) OVERCOMING THE LEGACY OF SANCTIONS Return to top

Restoring Public Infrastructure, Restoring Real Family Incomes

The Inadequacy of Oil-for-Food

Since early 1997, the UN has overseen an Oil-for-Food humanitarian programme which has allowed Iraq to buy humanitarian goods with the revenue earned from UN-monitored oil sales.

While Oil-for-Food has undoubtedly improved the humanitarian situation in Iraq by some significant margin, child health, for example, has not recovered its former levels.

In a 'Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Iraq - 1997', published in April 1998, UNICEF stated categorically, 'Economic sanctions on Iraq over the past seven years have had a devastating effect on the majority of the Iraqi people, particularly children.' The UN agency went on, 'The Oil-for-Food Plan has not yet resulted in adequate protection of Iraq's children from malnutrition/disease.' This continues to be the case.

For example, in November 1997, there were 960,000 chronically malnourished children under the age of five in Iraq, according to UNICEF. In September 2000, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation reported that there were at least 800,000 chronically malnourished children under the age of five in Iraq.

The Security Council's own Panel on Humanitarian Issues pointed out in March 1999 that Oil-for-Food was inherently incapable of solving the humanitarian crisis.

Regardless of the improvements that might be brought about in the implementation of the current humanitarian programme - in terms of approval procedures, better performance by the Iraqi Government, or funding levels - the magnitude of the humanitarian needs is such that they cannot be met within the context of the parameters set forth in resolution 986 (1995) [Oil-for-Food] and succeeding resolutions, in particular resolution 1153 (1998) [which expanded Oil-for-Food]. Nor was the programme intended to meet all the needs of the Iraqi people. (S/1999/356, 30 March 1999)

The Public Health Infrastructure

The level of investment needed to repair civilian infrastructure destroyed in 1991 - to be able to provide clean drinking water so that children will not die of waterborne diseases, for example - has been far beyond the capacity of Oil-for-Food.

The electricity sector, which underpins the rest of the public health infrastructure, requires at least $7bn by itself, according to the UN Secretary-General's February 1998 review of Oil-for-Food: 'Provisional estimates considered during the programme review indicated that some $870 million would be required to address immediate rehabilitation and maintenance needs for the electricity infrastructure (generation, transmission and distribution) and the total value of all projects necessary to address the sector's operating problems amounted to over $7 billion.' (S/1998/90) (Note that a special UN mission to Iraq in 1991 estimated the cost of repairing the electricity sector at $12bn. S22799, July 1991)

The Secretary-General warned in February 1998, 'Under present conditions, the rate of deterioration will continue to increase and, with it, the threat of a complete breakdown of the network. The humanitarian consequences of such a development could potentially dwarf all other difficulties endured by the Iraqi people.'

In September 2000, the Secretary-General noted that a recent fire in the transmission lines at Mussaiyab Power Station 'resulted in the loss of 600 MW' of power, which in turn increased power cuts to 8 hours per day for consumers in Baghdad and up to 20 hours in other affected governorates.

The fundamental situation remains unchanged: 'The entire electricity grid is in a precarious state and is in imminent danger of collapsing altogether should another incident of this type occur.' Such a collapse could cause 'humanitarian consequences' which would 'potentially dwarf all other difficulties endured by the Iraqi people.'

Apart from the electricity sector, many other elements of public health infrastructure need to be addressed - at the cost of billions of dollars - if, for example, child health is to be restored to anything like its former level. The sewage, sanitation, water purification, telecommunications, medical equipment repair and re-stocking, and health facility restoration. Furthermore, UN missions have identified Iraqi agriculture and education as key public health sectors needing massive funding.

And underpinning all of this reconstruction must be the Iraqi oil industry, which successive UN reports have described as 'lamentable'. Without billions of dollars worth of investment and repair in this sector, the government will be unable to sustain purchases of vital humanitarian goods and services from abroad.

These needs have far exceeded the capacity of Oil-for-Food. While oil prices are buoyant at the time of writing, and Iraq is therefore predicted to earn over $10bn for humanitarian purposes in the next twelve months, there are no guarantees that prices will remain high.

It can be guaranteed, however, that there will be substantial time lags in purchasing, producing, importing, and installing key infrastructure goods. In the electricity sector, for example Kofi Annan warned in February 1998 that the 'implementation time of many requirements extends to two years or more'. (S/1998/90)

The International Committee of the Red Cross issued a report in December 1999 entitled Iraq: A decade of sanctions. The Red Cross acknowledged that Oil-for-Food 'has done much to alleviate the plight of the civilian population, especially as regards food and medicines'. 'However', the international humanitarian organisation remarked, Oil-for-Food 'has not halted the collapse of the health system and the deterioration of water supplies, which together pose one of the gravest threats to the health and well-being of the civilian population.' (Emphasis added.)

In other words, 'The most important problem in our view is the increasingly precarious situation of the public infrastructure' (Beat Schweizer, head of an ICRC delegation to Iraq, 23 January 2000, Associated Press report).

The Need For Purchasing Power

Quite apart from the inadequacies of Oil-for-Food in terms of the provision of public goods and services at the macro level, there is a fundamental problem which the programme cannot solve at the micro level.

An analysis of the impact of sanctions by two London School of Economics economists in 1991 pointed out that there is a difference between 'aggregate sanctions' (which affect the quantities of goods and services which can be imported into Iraq) and 'effective sanctions' (which are measured in terms of how families and businesses are enabled or impoverished).

Jean Dreze and Haris Gazdar, who visited Iraq in the course of writing Hunger and Poverty in Iraq, 1991, tried to re-position the debate about sanctions.

'The "effects of sanctions" have often been analysed in terms of what these sanctions do to aggregate commodity supplies - how far food supplies, or medical supplies, or the supply of cement fall short of ordinary levels. What really matters, however, is how the sanctions affect the ability of households (or enterprises, in the case of raw materials and intermediate inputs) to acquire the commodities in question. "Effective sanctions" in that sense can be quite different from what sanctions look like on the basis of supply-centred analysis.'

To put it simply, vulnerable families need purchasing power as well as public services.

They need to be able to buy clothing, to rent accommodation, to buy fresh vegetables and fruit.

Unemployment in Iraq is estimated by former UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Hans von Sponeck to be over 60%. Those who are in employment are paid low wages in a massively devalued currency - in 1990, 1 Iraqi Dinar used to be worth £2; in 2000, £1 is worth around 3000 Iraqi Dinar.

To provide ordinary families with purchasing power, so that they do not have to sell their food rations to buy other necessities, will mean reflating the Iraqi economy to generate employment and to restore the value of the Iraqi Dinar.

According to an Associate Press report of 22 July 1999, Deputy US Ambassador to the UN Peter Burleigh cast doubt on the need for an increased level of Oil-for-food revenues: 'My question would be, if more than $5.2bn is now needed, what for? Is that humanitarian needs? Or are we getting into suggestions about rebuilding the Iraqi economy, which is a very different question for the Security Council?'

The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation very clearly stated in 1995 that the solution to the nutritional crisis in Iraq 'lies in adequate food supplies in the country, restoring the viability of the [Iraqi Dinar], and creating conditions for the people to acquire adequate purchasing power. But, these conditions can be fulfilled only if the economy can be put in proper shape enabling it to draw on its own resources, and that clearly cannot occur as long as the embargo remains in force.' (Emphasis added, Evaluation of Food and Nutrition Situation in Iraq, FAO 1995)

'Rebuilding the Iraqi economy' is, with respect to Mr Burleigh, not 'a very different question' from the question of meeting humanitarian needs in Iraq.

3) THE BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY Return to top

A Moral And Legal Framework For The Security Council

Procedural Failures

A number of commentators have assessed the legality and morality of the current sanctions regime on Iraq.

The Centre for Economic and Social Rights have pointed out (in their report Unsanctioned Suffering) that there was a moral and legal duty on the UN Security Council when it instituted the sanctions regime both to acknowledge its own responsibility for the human rights impact of the measures taken, and to establish mechanisms to monitor these human rights impacts.

'The Security Council has clearly violated these minimum procedural duties in the case of sanctions on Iraq. Notwithstanding frequent statements of concern regarding the humanitarian situation in Iraq, the Council has failed to acknowledge its own legal responsibility to protect the rights of Iraqi civilians suffering under sanctions. While Council resolutions often invoke the authority of international law, and condemn Iraq for violating the human rights of its own citizens, they do not acknowledge that the Security Council is itself bound by international law and human rights.'

'The Security Council has also violated its procedural duties by failing to monitor the impact of sanctions on human rights. For six years, the Council has devoted considerable resources and personnel to five newly-created commissions to monitor the implementation of the Council's resolutions in such areas as inspecting Iraqi weapons programs, establishing the border with Kuwait, and locating Kuwaitis prisoners of war. The work of these commissions has frequently been supported by actual or threatened military action. Yet the Security Council has not created a commission or devoted funding to monitor the human rights impact of sanctions, instead occasionally taking note of reports by other UN bodies and independent research groups.'

The Security Council has, since the CESR published these remarks, set up two bodies to investigate the humanitarian situation in Iraq, one in 1999, and one in 2000. However, neither has been charged with evaluating the humanitarian or human rights impact of the sanctions regime.

In UN Security Council Resolution 1302, the Security Council asked the UN Secretary-General 'to appoint independent experts to prepare by 26 November 2000 a comprehensive report and analysis of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, including the current humanitarian needs arising from that situation and recommendations to meet those needs, within the framework of the existing resolutions.'

The possibility that the humanitarian situation might require a fundamental alteration in the 'framework of the existing resolutions' was excluded in principle from the discussion.

Substantive Violations

The UN Security Council has a duty to uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 25 concerns the right of each person to 'a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family') and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Rights acknowledged in these treaties, which belong to each individual person in Iraq, have been violated by the sanctions regime.

Also relevant is the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, as the Centre for Economic and Social Rights observes:

'It is hard to think of a more grave breach of child rights in modern history than the suffering and death of hundreds of thousands of children under the age of five caused by a political dispute between "their" government and the international community. The Security Council shoulders a large measure of responsibility for these violations by maintaining sanctions without taking strong measures to prevent this suffering.'

The Committee on the Rights of the Child oversees the implementation of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. In October 1998, the Committee noted 'that the embargo imposed by the Security Council has adversely affected the economy and many aspects of daily life, thereby impeding the full enjoyment by the State party's population, particularly children, of their rights to survival, health and education.' (CRC/C/15/Add.94, emphasis added)

The Individual Nature Of Human Rights

The CESR points out that human rights belong to individuals, not to governments, and therefore cannot be reduced in value because of the behaviour of the state in which they live.: so that the Security Council 'remains accountable to human rights principles regardless of the conduct of the Iraqi government':

'As a matter of fundamental principle, human rights are based on the inherent dignity and worth of every human person, and are owed directly to individuals. These rights are not forfeited because of a government's misconduct'

Each mentally ill person who has suffered as a result of the sanctions regime, each elder reduced to destitution and homelessness, each child who has died of hunger and disease, each child who will grow up physically and mentally stunted because of malnutrition and the destruction of education, each individual who has suffered or who may suffer in the future because of the imposition of economic sanctions, has a claim on the members of the Security Council.

The Secretary-General has frequently drawn the attention of the Security Council to the 'human dimension' of the crisis in Iraq. That 'human' dimension is also a 'human rights' dimension and therefore a legal as well as a moral dimension.

4) THE WAY FORWARD Return to top

The Need To Lift The Economic Sanctions

An Evolving International Consensus

French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine marked the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Kuwait, and the imposition of sanctions on Iraq, by stating that the sanctions were 'cruel, ineffective and dangerous': 'cruel because they punish exclusively the Iraqi people and the weakest among them', 'ineffective because they don"t touch the regime, which is not encouraged to co-operate', and 'dangerous' because they 'accentuate the disintegration of Iraqi society.' (Reuters, 2 August 2000)

It was an unauthorised flight from France on 22 September 2000 that triggered a series of over 30 defiant flights from a host of nations including Syria and Iran, historic enemies of Baghdad. The flights have demonstrated the impatience of the international community with the slow pace of policy change, they have considerably accelerated the crumbling of sanctions on Iraq, and they have revealed starkly the isolation of Britain and the United States on this issue.

To be more accurate, the flights have exposed the isolation of the US and British governments.

British public opinion, for example, has moved considerably in the past two years. As noted at the outset, The Economist and The Lancet have both called for radical changes in the sanctions regime.

The Archbishop of Canterbury has added his voice to this growing chorus, speaking in New York on 14 September 2000:

'Well, we have had ten years of sanctions and there is no doubt they bite. But the problem is that those who suffer most are the ordinary people of Iraq. Indeed the condition of many Iraqis is desperate.

'From a Christian perspective, humanitarian considerations should become the principle informing any sanctions policy. This suggests at the very least that they need to be reconfigured to impact on those they are intended to target.

'That could be done in part by focussing on arms supplies and financial sanctions.'

This is all of a piece with the Liberal Democrats' decision to call for the lifting of non-military sanctions.

Even the Financial Times has suggested (7 August 2000) that 'Further modifications to the embargo should be examined, including the option of lifting civilian sanctions while maintaining a ban on arms sales and financial scrutiny over selected imports.'

The Inadequacy of Suspension

The framework of sanctions laid down in August 1990 was radically altered in purpose by UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), and has been modified again by UNSCR 1284 (1999).

The British and US governments appear to be the only Permanent Members of the Security Council wholeheartedly supporting the new framework laid down in UNSCR 1284.

From a humanitarian point of view, the package of measures offered in the Resolution is defined on the one hand by the continuing linkage between the resolution of the humanitarian crisis and the inspection crisis, and on the other hand by the temporary, conditional nature of the 'suspension' of economic sanctions offered in Resolution 1284.

For the sake of brevity, let us leave aside the evident failure of Resolution 1284 to break the deadlock during the course of the past eleven months, the vague nature of key provisions relating to the inspection process, and the moral and legal failure involved in making the ending of mass civilian suffering conditional on political cooperation.

Considering only the issue of 'suspension', the question arises whether the rolling suspension of economic sanctions for four months at a time is capable of resolving the humanitarian crisis.

Clearly, the suspension of both import and export restrictions could have a significant impact on employment and on the value of the Iraqi Dinar, and thus boost family purchasing power considerably.

It would have a powerful effect if we presume that the international community employs a limited, rational and humane interpretation of continuing restrictions on the import of 'dual use' items which could have military applications.

However, these effects on the private sector would be limited, and public sector reconstruction of the civilian infrastructure would be held back, by the uncertainty generated by the 'rolling' nature of the suspension of sanctions. The Iraqi oil industry requires massive foreign investment to prevent a decline in output and revenues. These are revenues which are central to the economy as a whole, and on which the reconstruction of the public health infrastructure in particular, depends.

Oil industry observers have made it clear that such foreign investment will not be forthcoming if every 120 days the guillotine may come down on millions of dollars worth of investment. The conditional 'rolling' suspension of economic sanctions is therefore a major, if unquantifiable, threat to the solution of the humanitarian crisis.

The Economist Intelligence Unit observed in March 2000 that 'Once sanctions are lifted, Iraq will have to undertake a reconstruction effort conservatively estimated at $50bn - 100bn just for essential infrastructural utilities, from GDP base, which, even including the grey and black economies, is less than $13bn in nominal terms.'

Improvements to oil-for-food could only help to 'bolster a basic safety welfare net, rather than herald a return to normality': 'To achieve the latter, sanctions will have to come to an end.'

Even if suspension can be achieved, and the record to date is one of abject failure, it is morally and legally unacceptable to continue to hold the health of 22 million people hostage to a politically-charged inspection process, and to place the humanitarian reconstruction effort under a guillotine every four months.

There Are Alternatives

A number of informed and respected observers have proposed new frameworks for UN-Iraq relations.

The underlying principle of many of these proposals, and the core of the emerging international consensus, is that the sanctions on Iraq must be radically and fundamentally altered in order to address the continuing humanitarian crisis.

We regret the fact that Security Council Resolution 1302 instructed an investigation into 'current humanitarian needs' in Iraq to draw up 'recommendations to meet those needs, within the framework of the existing resolutions.' (Emphasis added.)

We submit this report in the belief that the very serious humanitarian needs in Iraq cannot be met within the framework of existing resolutions. This is a judgement which we believe we share with a very large, and growing, proportion of international opinion.

We urge the members of the Security Council, and especially our own Government, to recast their policy towards the ordinary people of Iraq.

We do not believe that the lifting of economic sanctions is a panacea for the people of Iraq, or a quick fix. It will take years, perhaps decades, for civil society and public health to recover the wounds that have been inflicted over the past decade.

The lifting of economic sanctions is an essential pre-condition for recovery and a restoration of public health, of child health.

Without an end to economic sanctions, the future is bleak for another generation of Iraqis. And the moral burden for the United Nations in general, and for the Governments of Britain and the United States in particular, is heavy indeed.

As Denis Halliday said when resigning as UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, in October 1998,

'We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral.'

Hans von Sponeck, who resigned in February 2000, also in protest against the continuing sanctions on Iraq, recently declared at a meeting at the British Labour Party in Brighton, 'It is better to break sanctions than to break the law.'